The High Stakes Theater of Sinking Targets
The headlines are predictable. The United States, Japan, and the Philippines gather for a joint exercise. They tow a mock-up of a Chinese ZBD-05 amphibious vehicle or a decommissioned hull into the open sea. They pummel it with Hellfire missiles, 25mm cannons, and precision-guided bombs. The target sinks. The press releases cheer about "interoperability" and "deterrence."
It is a lie.
Not a lie of fact—the target did indeed sink—but a lie of utility. These Sinking Exercises (SINKEX) are the equivalent of a professional boxer bragging about knocking out a heavy bag that doesn't punch back. If you think blowing up a stationary, non-electronic, uncrewed piece of steel proves we can stop a Chinese invasion fleet in the South China Sea, you are falling for the most expensive piece of theater in modern warfare.
The ZBD-05 Fallacy
The specific use of a mock ZBD-05 is particularly egregious. For the uninitiated, the ZBD-05 is the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) premier amphibious fighting vehicle. It’s fast in the water, carries a 30mm cannon, and is designed to storm beaches.
In these recent drills, the "threat" is represented by a floating platform shaped like a ZBD-05. It has no radar signature management. It has no Active Protection Systems (APS). It isn't surrounded by a localized electronic warfare (EW) bubble that jams incoming seeker heads. Most importantly, it isn't moving at 28 knots through heavy surf while firing back.
When the Pentagon or the Philippine Western Command shows you footage of a missile hitting this target, they are showing you a physics experiment, not a combat simulation. We already know that high explosives destroy thin-skinned aluminum vehicles. We've known that since the 1940s. The challenge isn't the destruction of the asset; it's the acquisition and survivability of the platform trying to do the destroying.
The Sensor Gap Nobody Mentions
The "lazy consensus" among defense analysts is that these exercises build muscle memory. I’ve seen decades of these drills, and the muscle memory they build is dangerous. It teaches crews to expect a "clean" environment.
In a real-world clash in the Luzon Strait or the Spratlys, the environment will be "dirty."
- The Electromagnetic Spectrum: Your GPS will be spoofed. Your satellite links will be contested. That Hellfire missile that hit the static mock-up with surgical precision? In a real fight, its seeker head would be fighting through a wall of decoys and digital noise.
- The Saturation Problem: China doesn't send one ZBD-05. They send hundreds, supported by Type 052D destroyers and Type 055 cruisers. A SINKEX focuses on the "kill shot," but ignores the "sorting problem."
- The Intelligence Loop: In these exercises, everyone knows where the target is. It's at a specific latitude and longitude, provided in the briefing. In war, finding the fleet is 90% of the battle.
The Political Opiate of "Interoperability"
The word "interoperability" is a bureaucratic security blanket. It’s what generals say when they don't want to talk about the fact that the Philippine Navy's aging fleet and the U.S. Navy's high-end assets have massive communication gaps.
Blowing up a mock target together is "diplomatic interoperability." It looks great on a 4K drone feed. It satisfies the domestic audience in Manila that the "Big Brother" in Washington has their back. But it masks a terrifying reality: the logistics of a real-time, high-intensity conflict with a peer adversary would collapse these "joint" operations in hours.
If the U.S. and its allies were serious about deterrence, they wouldn't be sinking rusted hulls. They would be practicing "dark" maneuvers—operating under total EMCON (Emission Control), without any radio or radar signatures, trying to find a hidden target in a 500-square-mile box. But they don't do that. Why? Because it’s hard, it’s frustrating, and you can’t put a "successful" video of it on the evening news.
The Physics of the Kill
Let’s talk about the math that the PR teams ignore. Most of these targets are destroyed using AGM-114 Hellfires or similar short-range munitions launched from helicopters or small boats.
$F = ma$ is simple enough, but the energy required to stop an armored amphibious assault is not just about sinking one vehicle. It is about the "Rate of Departure." To stop an invasion, an defending force must achieve a kill rate that exceeds the enemy’s willingness to lose hulls.
By practicing on single, static targets, we are reinforcing a "one-shot, one-kill" mentality that is suicidal against a massed force. China’s strategy is built on "System Destruction Warfare." They don't care if you sink a ZBD-05. They care if they can blind your Aegis radar so you can't see the other fifty vehicles heading for the beach. Our exercises focus on the arrow; their strategy focuses on the eyes of the archer.
Stop Training for the Last War
I have watched the defense industry burn billions on "validation" tests that are rigged for success. A SINKEX is a rigged test. It is designed to produce a fireball, not a tactical breakthrough.
If we want to actually deter the PLAN, we need to stop the pyrotechnics.
- Target Drone Swarms: Stop shooting at one big ship. Shoot at 500 small, autonomous drones that mimic the actual signature of a landing craft.
- Degraded Environments: Conduct the entire exercise while the "Aggressor" force is actively jamming every frequency the defenders use.
- Cyber-Physical Integration: Don't just fire a missile. Prove you can fire it while your onboard fire-control system is being hammered by a simulated cyber-attack.
The Cost of the Illusion
The danger of the current approach is the false sense of security it breeds in the Philippine and Japanese leadership. They see a mock Chinese vehicle erupt in flames and think, "We can handle this."
This is the "Maginot Line" of the Pacific. It is a psychological defense built on the assumption that the enemy will behave like a tethered target. The ZBD-05 isn't just a vehicle; it’s a component of a massive, integrated kill web. Shooting at a shell of one is like trying to learn how to stop a virus by hitting a picture of a cell with a hammer.
We are wasting fuel, munitions, and time on a spectacle. The next time you see a video of a "successful" live-fire exercise in the South China Sea, don't look at the explosion. Look at what’s missing: the smoke, the noise, the confusion, and the terrifying reality of an enemy that refuses to sit still.
Until we start training for the chaos, we are just practicing for a parade.
Stop celebrating the sinking of empty steel. Start worrying about why we need the theater to feel safe.
